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We Do Not Know How to Love:  
Observations on  
Theology, Technology, and Disability 
 
Jana M. Bennett 
 
OES TECHNOLOGY ENABLE those who are disabled to be 
fuller members of society, or does it ultimately seek to 
eradicate disability and so promote a kind of eugenics 
against those who are disabled? In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, literature and debate on this question ran rampant. A common 
example is that of cochlear implants, which endured much debate at 
the time within the Deaf community regarding whether they eradicate 
an impairment— or whether implants actually do away with entire 
communities of the Deaf and thus displace an important minority cul-
ture.1 Yet, very little is written today on this question. Is it because the 
question is settled, or because we have become satisfied with the pre-
sumed answers? (Answers which, repeatedly, tend to be: decisions re-
garding cochlear implants should be left up to patients, focused on 
their autonomy, and almost entirely avoiding the more troublesome 
question of whether a culture is being eradicated.2) 
Similarly, in online contexts in the early 2000s, people extolled the 
internet as a place where those with disabilities would finally find 
themselves in equal position, authority, and accessibility related to 
those without disabilities. Relatively early in the development of the 
internet, scholars regarded digital technologies as ultimately promis-
ing and good for people of all disabilities, because of their nature as 
mitigating disabilities. For example, the internet is often credited with 
enabling access to texts for those who are visually impaired. Almost 
since the beginnings of web development, there has been impetus to 
make the web accessible to all, where “people can collaborate without 
1 See, for example, Robert Sparrow, “Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear 
Implants,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 135-52. 
2 See John B. Christiansen and Irene W. Leigh, “Children with Cochlear Implants: 
Changing Parent and Deaf Community Perspectives,” Archives of Otolaryngology—
Head and Neck Surgery 130, no. 5 (May 2004): 673-7; Neil Levy, “Reconsidering 
Cochlear Implants: The Lessons of Martha’s Vineyard,” Bioethics 16, no. 2 (2002): 
134-53. 
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barriers.”3 The rise of social media has seemed to fit into that kind of 
collaborative worldview. Yet today, very little is written on this point, 
even and especially in an age of social media, which has largely been 
presumed to be an equalizer. Those who do write about it are highly 
suspicious of whether new social media forms have actually engen-
dered the hoped-for social changes relating to disability. One set of 
scholars observes that the most recent iterations of the internet, some-
times called “web 2.0,”4 have meant a rejection of web standards that 
had been set for disability, through which disability is understood and 
recognized as a serious need in technological development from the 
very beginnings, rather than an add-on (and afterthought) for every 
new program that gets developed for the non-disabled. In other words, 
“web 2.0 has been developed in and by the same social world that 
routinely disables people with disability.”5 
Our narratives about disability and disease link to narratives about 
contemporary technology uses, but to my knowledge, few scholars 
have explored these connections. In this essay, I argue that predomi-
nant narratives about technology in combination with predominant de-
scriptions about disability revolve around understanding technology 
as an asocial tool, which narratively proclaims a kind of neutrality. 
People using technologies, and the contexts of both the technological 
users and their technologies, make little or no difference to ways tech-
nologies are described or used. My concern and further argument is 
that this has the effect of making people themselves become defined 
by tools to the point that some people begin to treat other people as 
tools rather than as people to be loved. 
My attempt at bringing together narratives about disability and 
technologies warrants a brief discussion about the inherent ambigui-
ties in describing both disability and technology, though I will also 
articulate further ambiguities throughout this essay. Some disabilities 
may seem clear and self-evident: perhaps the use of a wheelchair, or a 
person who is unable to feed himself. Yet a person with a broken arm 
might also be considered to have a disability, and so might a person 
with a far less visible condition, like a congenital heart defect. There 
is, too, as I shall discuss further below, the serious question of whether 
the term “disability” ever really applies to an individual person, or 
whether it is a social condition. Likewise, some technologies may 
seem clear and self-evident: the internet, especially with its variety of 
social media platforms, comes across in scholarship and literature as 
3 Katie Ellis and Mike Kent, Disability and New Media (New York: Routledge, 2011), 
2. 
4 This term, often used in discussions of digital scholarship, refers primarily to a stage 
in internet development where the focus is less on content and more on user-generated 
and facilitated interaction, one example of which might be today’s social media plat-
forms. 
5 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 3. 
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a clear form of technology. Yet what is less evident and obvious is 
how distinctive the internet as technology is, with its vast array of me-
chanical, physical, chemical and even social systems that are required 
to make it function. A pencil is a form of technology too, though with 
less immediate evidence of the array of systems fostering its produc-
tion and use, and if we think of it as technology at all, we think of it as 
an older technology with little thought to the fact that it too inculcates 
an array of mechanical, physical, chemical and even social systems. 
My above discussion of these ambiguities obviously takes pains to 
note, in a beginning kind of way, how both disabilities and technolo-
gies are implicated in human sociality. Yet, in this essay, I shall at-
tempt to display at least two main ways that the sociality of both tech-
nologies and disabilities is lost or hidden in our descriptions of them. 
The narratives I critique as too disconnected from our social world, I 
name as “asocial” or, sometimes, “disassociated.” In particular, I 
worry that we understand our technologies primarily as tools to be 
used, picked up and put down at will, but with little sense of their so-
ciality. One of our predominant narratives about technology is to de-
scribe it as an “asocial tool,” which impacts how we envision and de-
scribe disability. In a technology-as-asocial-tool mode, people may be 
evaluated in terms of their usefulness for the overall culture, or worse 
still, in terms of their technological know-how. The fusion of narra-
tives about technologies and disabilities negatively impacts people 
with disabilities, whose usefulness does not compute well in relation 
to a culture that thrives on efficiency.6 I proceed in this essay by first 
discussing some of the prominent views of ethicists who describe tech-
nologies in dissociative ways, and I articulate how these views relate 
to two primary models of disability (a medical model and a social 
model) that exist in our contemporary discourse. I focus especially on 
their theological anthropologies and their implications for work in dis-
ability.  
My concluding section provides some thoughts on what it might 
mean for theologians and others to narrate technological tools as so-
cially formative rather than as asocial or disinterested. In particular, I 
turn to discussion of love as communication, technology as communi-
cation, and how we might then understand technology socially form-
ative, especially in relation to the person of Jesus Christ. My primary 
theological interlocutor for this conversation on love and communica-
tion is Herbert McCabe, because the ways his work draws together 
these themes sheds important light on the present concerns about tech-
nology. I conclude with some thoughts on how a technological world 
can, indeed, be a world that shows us how to love. 
 
6 See Hans Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theolog-
ical Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). 
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DISABILITIES AND DISASSOCIATING SOLUTIONS 
It is important to begin by noting that when we are dealing with 
disability and technology together, we are bringing together several 
disciplines. Scholars often discuss disability in terms of bioethics 
questions (e.g., cochlear implants) or in terms of socio-political ques-
tions (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act and the ways that act 
is carried out). Technology, on the other hand, is often discussed in 
relation to communications faculties as well as a growing field of so-
ciology of technology. Part of the difficulty in thinking through tech-
nology and disability in relation to theological anthropology resides in 
the fact that very distinctive views of technology and disability emerge 
from those fields, though as I argue below, both often think in terms 
of technology-as-disassociative-tool, with different facets of that idea 
present. Yet because technology is not often identified as being the 
crux of the question in bioethics, and because disability is often ig-
nored in technology studies, these questions tend to go undiscovered 
and unanswered. Part of what I will do in this section is attempt to 
bring together views of disability with views of technology according 
to, first, bioethics discussions, and second, according to sociological 
and cultural discussions. 
 
Technology as Tool, Disability as Medical Problem 
Bioethicist Adam Briggle describes the current state of bioethics 
as a “thin,” “formal rational,” and “instrumentalist” view of a variety 
of bioethics questions, in which I would include considerations of peo-
ple with disabilities, to the point that a person with a disability may be 
overlooked or done an injustice if they do not quite fit the views of 
personhood emphasized in contemporary discourse.7 That is, in con-
trast to former strands of bioethics conversations in which “[s]ubstan-
tive rationality [that] asks whether the means are consistent with ulti-
mate ends or values,” the contemporary debate suggests that “formal 
rationality asks whether the means employed are being maximized to 
achieve assumed ends,” particularly in service of “autonomy, benefi-
cence, and justice.”8 Maximization of autonomy, beneficence and jus-
tice in turn emphasizes the “contractual nature of society” in which 
people are “atomistic rights-bearers” who determine their own good 
via their own will.9 Briggle’s articulation of contemporary bioethics 
raises concerns for those with disabilities, especially in its insistence 
on autonomy, beneficence and justice, exactly because autonomy for 
a person with disabilities is likely to look very different, if not un-
autonomous, compared to a person who is not so disabled. One of the 
7 Adam Briggle, A Rich Bioethics: Public Policy, Biotechnology, and the Kass Coun-
cil (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 33-4. 
8 Briggle, A Rich Bioethics, 33-4. 
9 Briggle, A Rich Bioethics, 62. 
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chief difficulties with this, as Adam Briggle notes, but also as scholars 
who think about the nature of human choices discuss, human desires 
and identities do not come before established human relationships or 
socio-political, economic, legal and other kinds of systems in which 
humans are engaged.10 
Yet the predominant bioethics view of the person that Briggle iden-
tifies lends itself very well to visions of technology-as-asocial-tool. In 
bioethics, especially, we presume that our tools can be picked up and 
put down at will, especially at the patient’s will. The principles of au-
tonomy and rationality act together in such a way to reinforce that the 
chief person responsible for deciding whether a tool will be used is the 
patient, or those acting on her behalf, and the chief person wielding 
the tools is the doctor, or other medical personnel. 
As diseases and disabilities are named and identified, so too the 
fixes are named and identified, precisely in relation to the kinds of 
technologies that can fix the problem. For example, problems associ-
ated with sudden-onset hearing loss include suggestions for how to 
identify sudden-onset hearing loss as early as possible, followed by 
specific descriptions of the range of devices that assist in fixing sud-
den-onset hearing loss.11 This is a common place understanding of this 
type of hearing loss and its fix, so it comes as little or no surprise. 
Indeed, readers may wonder why I lift up such an obvious example (as 
opposed to, say, more hot button technologically-related questions 
like contraception or embryonic stem cell research, which perhaps 
more obviously raise technological questions).  
It is important to see, however, the ways in which even so simple 
a description of condition and its fix intertwines with one predominant 
way of narrating disability. A medical model of disability emphasizes 
“disability as primary a medical or biological condition…. It claims 
that the disabled person’s functional ability deviates from that of the 
normal human body.”12 Medical models of disability presume such a 
thing as a “normal body” against which disability is measured. From 
that vantage point, medicine identifies and uses a variety of tools to 
correct deficiencies. A medical model of disability hence readily fits 
with a narrative of technology as a tool, which has as its aim correcting 
the modes of autonomy and rationality so that those with disabilities 
can fully (as possible) participate in a society that thrives on autonomy 
10 On the nature of choice, see, for example, Sheena Iyengar’s very interesting set of 
studies on how people’s choices do not either enhance their autonomies or lead to 
their betterment as people. The Art of Choosing (New York: Twelve, 2010). 
11 See, for example, N. Foden, et al., Australian Family Physician 42, no. 9 (2013): 
641-4. 
12 Deborah Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Con-
structive Possibilities, Academy Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
23. 
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and rationality. At the same time, medical models of disability pre-
sume that identifying what counts as a disability is simple and obvi-
ous, and especially left to experts. 
To see more especially how a tool-based view can operate, espe-
cially in relation to questions about medical diagnosis of disability, 
contemporary ethicist Julian Savulescu has argued, provocatively, that 
“we have a moral obligation or moral reason to enhance ourselves and 
our children. Indeed, we have the same kind of obligation as we have 
to treat and prevent disease.”13 Savulescu’s argument presupposes a 
specific view of disease, which involves the use of technologies to 
prevent disease. He takes this view further, however, to suggest that 
we have an obligation to humanity in general to use enhancement tech-
nologies as a means of improving ourselves. The limit to such medical 
fixes and enhancements resides solely in the individuals concerned. 
Savulescu, who heavily makes use of a utilitarian framework, suggests 
that while he thinks that “like deafness, intellectual disability [he gives 
the example of Down’s Syndrome] is bad. But my value judgment 
should not be imposed on couples who must bear and rear the child. 
Nor should the value judgment of doctors, politicians, or the state be 
imposed directly.”14 Savulescu’s view directly draws upon the horrors 
of enforced perfection via eugenics programs and he therefore claims 
that “[as] rational people, we should all form our own ideas about what 
is the best life. But to know what is the good life and impose this on 
others is at best overconfidence.”15 Broadly understood, then, technol-
ogies exist in this view as tools to be taken up and set down at will, at 
the behest of people who individually and autonomously determine 
whether a disease or disability exists, what that disease or disability is, 
and how it ought to be fixed. 
Yet Savulescu’s view does not deal with the much trickier ques-
tions related to the fact that no person, no one family, acts within a 
bubble, and that his solution directed at autonomy still does not get 
around the eugenics problem. That is to say, leaving the question up 
to individuals or parents or other such tightly constructed tiny com-
munities ignores the impact that these decisions make on others’ work 
and responsibilities. In addition, as Jeffrey Bishop has shown in his 
work on end-of-life care, the very posing of questions about of quality 
13 Julian Savulescu, “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human 
Beings,” in Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, ed. Bonnie Steinbock (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 516. 
14 Julian Savulescu, “Deaf Lesbians, ‘Designer Disability,’ and the Future of Medi-
cine,” British Medical Journal 325, no. 7367 (October 5, 2002): 771-773, at 772. 
15 Savulescu, “Deaf Lesbians, ‘Designer Disability,’ and the Future of Medicine,” 
773. 
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of life shapes the kinds of options people believe they have, in partic-
ular with respect to how we view our technologies and machines.16 
Another way to put this is to recognize that the very ways people pre-
sume narratives about Down’s Syndrome shapes the kinds of choices 
parents believe they have regarding genetic testing, abortion and 
bringing a child to full term.17 
The more minor medical diagnoses I discuss above, with sudden-
onset hearing loss signifies the kind of narrative that Briggle describes 
however: a shift in bioethical thought that focuses on ends in relation 
to happiness as measured by autonomy and rationality, over against 
that of a substantive rationality. The “big issues,” in other words, only 
mirror how conversations typically function. Consider the burgeoning 
issue of artificial contraception. A significant component of recent de-
bates on artificial contraception use regards questions about whether 
human fertility is, properly speaking, a disease and whether, therefore, 
it needs to be fixed. When the Institute of Medicine released its rec-
ommendations for women’s health care coverage under the Afforda-
ble Care Act, its rationale for contraceptives included: 
 
Unintended pregnancy is linked to a host of health problems. Women 
with unintended pregnancies are more likely to receive delayed or no 
prenatal care and to smoke, consume alcohol, be depressed, and expe-
rience domestic violence during pregnancy. Unintended pregnancy 
also increases the risk of babies being born preterm or at a low birth 
weight, both of which increase their chances of health and develop-
mental problems. Family planning services are preventive services 
that enable women and couples to avoid an unwanted pregnancy and 
to space their pregnancies to promote optimal birth outcomes. Preg-
nancy spacing is a priority for women’s health because of the in-
creased risk of adverse pregnancy outcomes for pregnancies that are 
too closely spaced (within 18 months of a prior pregnancy).18 
 
The IOM supported these concerns with a variety of studies demon-
strating such adverse effects. Opponents of the contraceptives recom-
mendation argued, in part, against the idea of contraception as fixing 
16 See Jeffrey Bishop, The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the 
Dying (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011). 
17 For example, Savulescu’s knee-jerk reaction to Down’s Syndrome babies in his 
“Deaf Lesbians” article is that Down’s Syndrome ought, to rational people, count as 
a problem best to be done away with. 
18 Linda Rosenstock, “Clinical Preventative Services for Women: Closing the Gaps,” 
Testimony provided by the Institute of Medicine Committee on Preventative Services 
for Women, www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-Preventive-
Services-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps/Written%20Testimony-House%20Judici-
ary%20Hearing.pdf. Accessed August 25, 2014. 
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a medical condition, since on their view, fertility cannot be classified 
as such.19 
Disability in relation to digital media similarly looks like technol-
ogy-as-disassociative-tool, oftentimes where technology appears as a 
fix for predicaments individuals with disabilities experience. For ex-
ample, “[d]igital technology allows the manipulation of information 
in terms of appearance, text size, color, and mode of output including, 
for example, text-to-sound or Braille. In theory, digital information 
can be accessed by many users with different needs in different 
ways.”20 As the authors go on to note, however, in practice, this does 
not happen, precisely because technology is no longer satisfyingly de-
scribed (if it ever quite was) as the tools that we use to assist in our 
daily lives, among other things. That is, “the web becomes more com-
plex and a more ubiquitous part of life” to the point that descriptions 
of the web, or indeed of many other forms of technology, inadequately 
use tool imagery. Such descriptions and uses of technology, broadly 
speaking, inhibit our abilities to reflect on and imagine better possibil-
ities and ways of understanding what it means to be a human that uses 
technologies. 21 
There are several difficulties with the kinds of descriptions I men-
tion above about disability and technology. Some of these difficulties 
relate to what I mentioned in the introduction. How does the theolog-
ical concept of love relate, or not, to the descriptions and visions we 
have of (disabled) humanity on one hand, and technology use on the 
other? One point that has arisen again and again in discussions of med-
ical models of disabilities and the technologies that fix them is a focus 
on rationality and autonomy. This focus privileges only one of many 
possible aspects of what it means to be human. It is not clear that ra-
tionality and autonomy, especially in the Western senses in which 
these terms typically appear in discourse, are the best ways of thinking 
about what it means to be a human person. Stanley Hauerwas notes in 
a 1986 essay: “the very humanity that causes us to cry out against suf-
fering, that motivates us to seek to eliminate retardation, is also the 
source of our potentially greatest inhumanity.”22 The presence of tech-
nology does not abrogate what has always been a difficult negotiation: 
19 For two very different discussions of this point, but both raising strong questions 
about the idea of fertility as medical problem, see: Susan Windley-Daoust, Theology 
of the Body, Extended: The Spiritual Signs of Birth, Impairment, and Dying (Hobe 
Sound, FL: Lectio Publishing, 2014) and Jennifer Block, Pushed: The Painful Truth 
about Childbirth and Modern Maternity Care (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 
2007). 
20 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 48. 
21 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 48. 
22 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the 
Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1986), 160. 
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how to live with suffering— our own and others’ and what it means 
to love in the midst of that suffering.  
A further concern is the degree to which love and machines inter-
mix. Theologian Deborah Creamer suggests that a medical model 
tends to identify the human body as “a biological machine that func-
tions to a greater or lesser extent.”23 The “machine” notion of the body 
makes the body itself out to be a tool as well, a tool that— if it func-
tions well— heightens a person’s ability to participate in society, es-
pecially a consumer society that takes a dim view to people who are 
less than useful. If we Christians wish to speak of love of neighbor, 
one of the questions we need to confront with asocial or dissociative 
views of technologies is what it means to love a human being who is 
acted upon largely as a bodily machine. As MIT professor Sherry 
Turkle has discussed (convincingly on my view) in her book Alone 
Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each 
Other, in our technocratic age, we are developing an inverse ability to 
relate to human beings and machines.24 While studies on human be-
havior and robotics suggest that we develop and demonstrate many 
forms of sympathy for them, even after knowing the ins and outs of 
how the robots are programmed to respond to us in certain ways, stud-
ies on human treatment of each other, especially when we lurk behind 
our screens, suggests an increasing inability to respond with sympa-
thy, empathy and compassion. These are changes that Turkle observes 
with some concern, especially as she observes how we place robotic 
and internet technologies as presumable appropriate substitutes for hu-
man interaction with the most vulnerable among us: the elderly, chil-
dren, and those with disabilities. The ones who lose out the most from 
our love affairs with technologies, suggests Turkle, are those whose 
humanity is often described or viewed at the very marginal edges of 
human existence. Technologies become asocial, disassociating us 
from each other, in real and felt ways. 
The key difficulty, I suggest, is in the ways this overarching asocial 
view of technologies limits our abilities to see other possible actions 
and ways of describing and living out human relationships. Such a 
view limits our creative thought and action and hence limits our ability 
to love and respond to love. As Herbert McCabe suggested in his book 
Love, Law and Language: love is a “growing word”, a word that we 
learn to use over a lifetime of experience and encountering exemplary 
lovers. Yet as McCabe hastens to note in commenting on what it 
means that love is a “growing word”, “this does not in the least imply 
that it is a vague word, one that might mean almost anything. It is just 
that a word like ‘love’ will always have uses that are not constricted 
23 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 24.  
24 See Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and 
Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011).  
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by such rules for its use as you have managed to formulate any partic-
ular time.”25 That is, the word “love” is so spacious and mysterious 
that it needs great capacity for people learn how to use it, and live it, 
well. Our technologies, being part of the fabric of our social lives as 
they are, need to be narrated as capable of such spacious activity as 
well. 
An additional concern with asocial views of technology hinge on 
how well we name and understand disease, disability and other com-
monly-thought medical conditions. Our ability, or lack thereof, in 
identifying diseases and conditions constricts our actions just as do 
our uses of technology in relation to fixing those conditions. That is, 
what if the very ways we name diseases is wrong, and what if the very 
technologies we use already inscribe certain, likely unhelpful, views 
of disability?  
Bioethicist Carl Elliot has written several books calling into ques-
tion positions like Savulescu’s, and exposing the ways communities 
shape (in sometimes very questionable ways) diagnoses and presump-
tions about what counts as a medical disease. One of his most often 
cited examples is a chapter in which he discusses apotemnophiliacs, 
that is, people who desire to have limbs chopped off.26 With all their 
limbs intact, they feel incomplete as themselves. Elliot observes that 
the number of people in any given human community who desire to 
have limbs cut off is vanishingly small; the advantages apotemnophil-
iacs have in an internet age is precisely that a community composed 
entirely of apotemnophiliacs is possible. Moreover, the existence of 
groups that now advocate for apotemnophilia means that now there 
are several people who might approach surgeons with the request to 
chop off an otherwise healthy limb, and the names of surgeons who 
acquiesce get traded within these communities. 
Part of Elliot’s point is to note that what apotemnophiliacs desire— 
to be more themselves— is the same kind of argument that others with 
more identifiable “diseases” make in advocating for treatment: for ex-
ample, anxiety disorders across the spectrum, or a desire for breast 
enhancement surgery. Elliot seeks to blur lines between medical diag-
nosis and a person’s identity, especially in relation to how communi-
ties shape and form both diagnoses and identities, and even the very 
notion that medical diagnosis is largely a cut-and-dried task that has 
very few grey areas or wiggle room (despite the fact that many physi-
cians are quick to say that diagnosis is far more an art than a craft). A 
medical model of disability seeks the problem to be fixed, as compared 
with all the “normal” people in the crowd, and then seeks the tool to 
25 Herbert McCabe, Love, Law and Language (London: Continuum, 2003), 18. 
26 See Carl Elliot, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream 
(New York: Norton, 2003), especially chapter nine. 
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be used; it also depends on a universal norm against which disability 
gets measured. 
Elliot develops the technology point far less well but it is important 
nonetheless. The question of communities and identities is surely part 
of the whole question, but the specific ways that technology enables 
creation of communities, indeed could even perhaps be considered the 
community (in a certain way) of apotemnophiliacs, is indispensable. 
Without the logic of technologies and their particular ways of foster-
ing communication, there is no coming-into-being of apotemnophilia, 
and no community of apotemnophiliacs or sympathizers that presume 
its normalcy. Carl Elliot’s point in this chapter is not that he neces-
sarily thinks apotemnophilia or other such diagnoses are good or 
healthy or beneficial, but the interconnectedness between the diseases 
and problems we humans identify in each other, and the many facets 
of human life, including technologies, that form and shape our think-
ing about what counts as a problem as well as a solution to it. 
Thus, focusing on a medical model enables almost complete focus 
on each individual person and directs the “problem” of disability and 
its technological fix toward the disabled person, rather than examining 
the communities of which they are part, and the ways even our tools 
act on us and shape us all. These concerns about medical models have 
led, however, to a different vision of disability, one that at the outset 
looks more promising in its understanding of both disability and tech-
nology.  
 
Disability as Socially Embedded, 
Technology as Formative of the Social 
Elliot’s concerns about medical diagnosis, and the attendant cri-
tiques about technology use relates to what disability scholars increas-
ingly name as the “social model” of disability. Social models of disa-
bility are often regarded in stark contrast to medical models, since so-
cial models tend to understand disability as a marker of societal prej-
udice and lack of accommodation to peoples’ various impairments. As 
theologian Deborah Creamer notes, social models understand disabil-
ity as “social constructed and results from society not being organized 
according to the needs of disabled people. The ‘problem’ is no longer 
identified as the physical, cognitive, or psychological characteristics 
of the individual, but rather is identified as prejudicial, exclusive, and 
oppressive attitudes and barriers.”27 Mitigating against socially con-
structed disability means becoming engaged in social activism against 
unjust barriers and exclusion of the disabled. Creamer further notes 
that examples of social models of disability include the passage of the 
27 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 25.  
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Americans with Disabilities Act and a focus on giving all people 
“equal opportunity and full participation.”28  
On a social model of disability, scholars make distinctions between 
impairment, which is the physical attribute a person has, over against 
disability, which is the social construct. Impairment, on this view, is 
analogous to whether a person is left-handed or right-handed, than it 
is a question of how well a particular person matches up with the con-
cept of “normal.” Left- and right-handedness provides a strong anal-
ogy here in the sense that many of the tools humans create have been 
with the right-handed person in mind, such that left-handedness be-
comes a problem and a “disability” in the face of a majority culture 
where door knobs and kitchen utensils (among many, many other 
things) are decisively right-handed. The social construction model of 
disability is the most-often used model in contemporary disability 
scholarship, though some theologians have begun to explore still other 
ways of articulating disability.29 
Identifying that the problem is chiefly about society’s response (or 
lack thereof) rather than with the person who has impairment affects 
peoples’ engagement with and assumptions about technologies. Ra-
ther than thinking in terms of technologies as tools for individuals with 
individual problems, technologies instead become communally fo-
cused, known as universal accessible design. One of the benefits of 
thinking about technology in this way is that, while technologies de-
veloped particularly for disabilities end up seeming weak, technolo-
gies developed for broad use do not carry these negative connotations. 
For example, an architectural design of a ramp can be accessible to 
wheelchairs and walkers alike, seamlessly woven into building design 
in such a way that there need be no sign indicating “Wheelchair 
Ramp” any than there need be a sign indicating “Walker Stairs.” Other 
examples include curb cuts that assist wheelchairs, but also strollers, 
skateboards, and walkers, and family restrooms that are large and spa-
cious, and can be used across gender, age and ability. One example in 
current design is the SMS system, developed for those are hearing im-
paired and Deaf, but used by nearly everyone with a cell phone for 
texting. 
The internet has often been seen as a special site for universal ac-
cessible design. It lacks many of the physical barriers, particularly 
with respect to building barriers, that may prevent those with disabili-
ties from even entering through the doors to attend meetings, classes, 
28 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 26. 
29 Deborah Creamer’s book, cited above, is a prime example of someone exploring 
other ways of articulating disability, as is the work of John Swinton, Brian Brock, and 
their collaborators, in Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2013). 
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movies and so forth. Additionally, internet avatars provide great flex-
ibility in terms of peoples’ representations of themselves, so that fe-
males can present as males, those without legs can present as having 
legs, and so forth. Such an experience of an avatar can be liberating 
simply because the disabled aspects that often cause knee-jerk and 
prejudiced reactions to persons with disabilities can disappear.  
Just as claims that the web is gender or race neutral are specious, 
so too arguments that the web is disability neutral are problematic. 
Digital documents may claim to be accessible for those with visual 
impairments, but the documents themselves do not interface well with 
screen readers. Those with hearing impairments frequently encounter 
barriers regarding sound and video, especially in relation to inaccurate 
or non-visible captioning, but also whether those who speak sign lan-
guage can use that language to sign in to various online platforms. 
While the ability to surpass such barriers exists in many cases, the at-
tention to details regarding technologies required to surpass those bar-
riers is not present. 
I suggest that part of the difficulty is that some of the prevailing 
presumptions about digital technology and impairment presume aso-
cial views of technologies, even as they explicitly advocate social 
models of disability. Though there is a key and significant shift from 
individual to society in narratives about disability, there is no similar 
shift in narratives about technologies as embedded in social life as 
well. Technologies are often understood, broadly, as tools for elimi-
nating social discrimination, with no special attention to the nature of 
the technological “tool” itself. Universal accessible design sounds so 
terrific, that it is easy to make very generalized statements about its 
benefits, especially online. Yet, as Katie Ellis and Mike Kent note, 
universal designs end up not being as universal as sometimes hoped, 
since some groups may be helped and others not.30 Universal ramps, 
for example, could be exceedingly dangerous for walkers in inclement 
weather, and websites that are made accessible for visual impairments 
are not necessarily accessible for other kinds of impairments, or for 
use by people with no impairment. The social media site Facebook has 
become known as particularly inaccessible to those with disabilities, 
in contrast to the now defunct MySpace. Much of the reason is in the 
design of the sites themselves, and associated philosophies driving the 
designs. MySpace, with its fewer guidelines and greater options for 
individual collaboration with the program itself was recognized for its 
greater accessibility.31  
Shifting the focus from individual to society, then, does not neces-
sarily mitigate against an asocial view of technologies, and less still 
30 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 93. 
31 Ellis and Kent, Disability and New Media, 111. 
                                                     
 Theology, Technology, and Disability 103 
 
toward reflecting on technologies themselves in use relating to disa-
bilities. Indeed, the Facebook versus MySpace example indicates how 
dissociative views of technology mitigate against accessibility. Face-
book’s emphasis on controlling its medium and interface has become 
the standard, perhaps most evidently relating to privacy controls, 
though I suggest that Facebook’s control over all aspects of its design 
and functionality affects questions about accessibility as well.  
What is especially interesting in the case of Facebook’s privacy 
concerns is that, while certain descriptions of Facebook involve insist-
ence about the new world or new era that Facebook ushers in, most of 
our conversations about Facebook do not reflect such change. A 2010 
Time Magazine article notes: “Facebook has changed our social DNA, 
making us more accustomed to openness. But the site is premised on 
a contradiction: Facebook is rich in intimate opportunities — you can 
celebrate your niece's first steps there and mourn the death of a close 
friend — but the company is making money because you are, on some 
level, broadcasting those moments online.”32 Yet while we speak 
about Facebook doing something distinctive, changing our social 
DNA, our speech about Facebook and its privacy controls remains at 
the level of tool. How do we fix our concerns about Facebook privacy 
controls? There is a list: turn off certain Facebook functions, avoid 
posting baby pictures, go to these websites and click on these links. 
Yet if it is true that Facebook really does change our very way of re-
lating to each other and to it, it cannot be the case that a simple tool 
view suffices as a fix.  
I note here that Savulescu’s argument for enhancement technolo-
gies articulated above relates equally well in a social disability model. 
For someone who thinks that society is to blame for holding back those 
with impairments, technologies, broadly defined, provide ways for-
ward toward incorporating bodies into a fully-functioning society pre-
cisely by enhancing their bodies. What now count as “normal” imped-
iments to human imaginings also become enhanced through technol-
ogy so that in effect, each body no longer needs to exist according to 
“normal” versus “disabled” labels, but rather “enhanced” and “unen-
hanced.” Such views of both technology and disability hint at both an 
idyllic present and future, one in which differences wrought by disa-
bility are made relative by the fact that all humans seek enhancements 
of one kind or other. We are all imperfect bodies seeking perfection, 
or as close as we can come, via technology use.  
One of the primary difficulties in these descriptions of disability 
and the attendant technological concerns is that we humans still want 
to name ourselves as masters of our technologies, including and espe-
32 Dan Fletcher, “How Facebook is Redefining Privacy,” Time Magazine (May 20, 
2010), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798,00.html. 
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cially masters of the social media websites we use, without quite real-
izing the ways that technology masters us, and particularly masters, 
and even hides, those who are disabled when we presume too much 
about our technological tools. If we really can master technologies, 
then we really can use them as tools to pick up and put down at will, 
to fix individual and social affects wrought by disabilities, and more 
besides. If we cannot master technologies, then… what about disabil-
ity and pain and suffering? In a world where not leaving people suf-
fering is one of the highest goods we presume we can achieve, perhaps 
even equivalent to loving that person, asocial descriptions of technol-
ogy reinforces certain views about hope and love (or lack thereof).  
It should be said, as well, that the presumption that technology 
fixes things in a way that requires little or no imagination about tech-
nology’s or disability’s connections to our social world also tends to 
neglect or silence the fact that for many people with impairments who 
experience disabilities, technologies never thoroughly erase pain and 
suffering or the sense that one is “not normal.” Indeed, to return to the 
question of cochlear implants that I raised at the beginning, lay people 
often presume that cochlear implants will operate somewhat akin to 
glasses in the sense that they will restore hearing to something like 
20/20 vision, which we accept as normal eyesight. Yet, in fact, coch-
lear implants do not achieve this feat; for the user hearing still often 
sounds mechanical. Add to this the surrounding questions of Deaf cul-
ture and the degree to which cochlear implants raise questions about 
eugenicizing whole communities, then obtaining a cochlear implant 
can potentially increase suffering on two fronts. Hearing is both not 
“normalized” and a person may experience doubts and concerns about 
the degree to which one belongs to a community should an implant be 
attempted. 
Thinking technologically about human beings and enhancements 
can mean that disability becomes simply one among many things to 
be eradicated, such that disability as a specific part of some human 
beings disappears. As well, a focus on enhancements can make it look 
like everyone is disabled, in a sense, everyone in need of technological 
enhancement, but with all the technological enhancements directed to-
ward individuals rather than their social and cultural contexts. 
Thus, while a social view is in some ways more positive with re-
spect to people with disabilities, in the sense that the “blame” for dis-
ability is not placed solely on the disabled themselves, such a view 
also puts certain constraints on our abilities to learn to love. Love is 
not boundless in the sense that just any activity, any use of technology, 
counts as love, even when directed at the social problems we identify. 
Nor is any sense of having “fixed” a problem the likely boundary of 
what it means to love. To the contrary, learning to love people in our 
uses of technologies and even with a sense that it is the social that 
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creates disability, removes none of the burden that a call to love places 
on our interactions with individuals.  
All that said, I think a social model of disability has good potential, 
especially if we likewise can understand and articulate technologies in 
relation to social formation. Perhaps one of the benefits of disabilities 
is that they offer spaces where we can see some of our technologies’ 
workings and also failures. While I do think that we humans generally 
take technologies both far too seriously than we ought (but in the 
wrong ways), and far less seriously than we ought (but in the wrong 
ways), I am not an advocate of technological rejection. Indeed, the 
insistence of those who are disabled pressing constantly against the 
inaccessibility that they encounter in a range of technologies affords 
some hope for thinking through what it means to need technologies 
but also how to grapple with the various problems technologies pre-
sent, some of which I have represented above.  
 
HOW DO WE LEARN TO LOVE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL ERA? 
Thus far, I have broadly discussed what I see as two majority ways 
technologies, especially in relation to disabilities, get discussed and 
interpreted. Whether the focus is on the individual with a disability, or 
on society that creates a disability where only impairment existed be-
forehand, I suggest that a nearly automatic response is to consider 
what can fix the problem so described, and in primarily asocial ways. 
In this final section, I briefly and very broadly discuss a potential the-
ological way forward, one that perhaps permits us judiciously to use 
some technologies as tools, but also helps us articulate a far more com-
plex narrative that may not, on its own, solve questions about disabil-
ity as such, but may at least allow us to think more proactively about 
what it means to use our technologies in the service of love. My brief 
exploration of themes about Christ, technology, communication and 
love here will not be wholly satisfying; this work will need further 
development. Yet as I suggested at the beginning of this essay, I do 
not wish simply to describe the problems I see regarding technology 
and disability without also suggesting possible different way forward. 
A first step is to think about technology not merely as a tool, but as 
constituting a social world, naming ways that we relate to other hu-
mans, even and especially when people do not quite realize or articu-
late that relationship, particularly when the sociality of technologies 
has been disrupted. Brian Brock’s work on technology and theology 
articulates such an assessment in his descriptions of historical devel-
opments of a range of technologies. He discusses how the develop-
ment of the Psalter and practices of this “textually formed performance 
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of collective worship” in which peoples’ very bodies and also relation-
ships to other bodies are shaped and formed.33 By contrast, he finds 
that the increasing use of books, as such, in the Scholastic period and 
later, makes use of bookish technologies in such a way that the focus 
becomes the individual reading that book, and memory becomes “a 
carefully constructed archive of wisdom contained in the individual’s 
mind.”34 Brock then carries his discussion to a consideration of pre-
sent-day Christian worship online, where he suggests, “[when] the 
consumption of people’s everyday lives has become entertainment, 
and surveillance an everyday fact of life, a new humanity is born… 
the public and publicity become all-encompassing.”35 How, then, does 
this social world born of internet relationships impinge on Christian 
life in particular? Brock suspects that the mode of constant self-publi-
cation in internet life turns us away from other, more gospel ways of 
relating to people. 
My main point in bringing up Brock here is to attempt to show, in 
brief, how examinations of technologies require a view toward the so-
cial. A utilitarian technological focus on “fixes” tends to focus on one 
individual, or individual part of social fabric, assuming that once 
fixed, that individual can then more fully participate in social fabric— 
whether that “fix” involves a person with hearing loss, a privacy con-
trol setting, or as in Brock’s examples, an individual church hoping to 
fix declining membership simply by generating a web presence. Such 
a view is asocial, not requiring attention to particularities. 
For Christians, recognizing the kinds of social formation that tech-
nology engenders can have several possible responses, including the 
well-known approach of Christian societies themselves rejecting var-
ious forms of technology. Many contemporary theologians writing 
about technologies have been hesitant to make quite so drastic a move, 
since in most cases rejection of certain technologies merely postpones 
inevitable further conversations as technologies continue to develop. 
In relation to particular questions about disability, moreover, rejection 
of technologies in whole or in part stand, in whole or in part, to ignore 
peoples’ pain and suffering and the effects of their impairments/ disa-
bilities. That is, such a response to technology is as potentially eugen-
icizing as a medical model’s overemphasis of cochlear implants may 
be. 
Attempting to discuss technologies in terms of social formation is 
difficult, however. Even in this essay where I am attempting to narrate 
the ways we often describe technologies as asocial, and turn toward 
33 Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2010), 274. 
34 Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 275. 
35 Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 280. 
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social narratives in contrast, I have at times failed. I suspect that cre-
ating the kind of community that pays attention to technology for its 
sociability, or lack thereof, requires embodied practices that help 
shape peoples’ responses to technology in ways different from our un-
reflective approaches. 
My concern and proposed remedy takes a cue from problems in 
Christology. Too often, the meaning of the incarnation is reduced to 
asocial usefulness, too. Jesus’s life is reduced to a set of teachings, a 
useful person on the sidelines who could be consulted for making dif-
ficult decisions, or again, a useful emblem to display at will. This 
problem is a main concern of Wittgensteinian Thomist Herbert 
McCabe, who articulates again and again how God Incarnate cannot 
be so easily used and discharged, in ways similar to the technological 
tools I have described above. In one of his later Christological essays 
called “He Was Crucified, Suffered Death, and Was Buried,” McCabe 
writes, “[Jesus’] alternative was not a philosophy or a theology or a 
social theory or a political programme. It was simply himself. Believe 
in me, he says.”36 McCabe continues by maintaining the crucial point 
that what it means to believe in Jesus is to enter into a relationship 
with Jesus, and the only way to do so is to make a response to Jesus 
with one’s whole life.  
Elsewhere, McCabe observes: “Jesus is not offering a blueprint for 
a new kind of society, an ideal which men [sic] may or may not choose 
to realize, he is offering himself as the centre of this new society.”37 
McCabe strongly rejects motifs that describe Jesus primarily in terms 
of useful tools that lead to a better society, as in the blueprint, but ra-
ther as the new society itself. What McCabe does here is place all fo-
cus, all emphasis, on the whole of who Jesus is, rather than making 
any hint whatsoever that Jesus might be a step on the road toward the 
solution or ideal we seek. 
Technology is often defined in terms of mere usefulness because 
sociality, too often, is defined in utilitarian terms (i.e., social contract 
theory), where humans exist as apparent independent beings who 
come together at stated times for stated purposes, and especially to 
“fix” problems requiring, say, the use of an army, or taxation and so 
forth.38 In the revelation to which McCabe refers, the incarnation con-
stitutes a set of social relations, which are not a means to an end but a 
sacrament— a making present— of the end of reconciliation and love. 
Consider the praise Jesus gives to a woman who wastes an entire jar 
of expensive perfume by breaking the jar and pouring the contents on 
36 Herbert McCabe, God Still Matters (New York: Continuum, 2002), 98 (emphasis 
original). 
37 McCabe, God Still Matters, 130 (emphasis original). 
38 This is certainly how I interpret Robert Nozick’s account of justice and society. See 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 
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his feet. Both jar and perfume are ancient forms of technology that 
have an obvious use. But that “use” is spoiled. The jar is broken. 
Wasted in terms of use, the broken jar of perfume becomes a sign of 
the woman’s self-giving love—which itself serves as a sign of God’s 
self-giving love poured out, regardless of expense. 
McCabe sees love embodied especially in the particular commu-
nity of Christian church and its practices, and so do others whose work 
borrows from his ideas.39 In these terms, technologies can be seen not 
merely as useful, but as “making present” sociability— sociability that 
conveys wholeness, reconciliation, and redemption in itself, in just the 
way that Jesus cannot be a mere blueprint, but is himself what we seek. 
In relation to disability and technology, then, what it means to think 
of technology as sociable formation is for whole communities to put 
on the technologies that are so often used as fixes for disabilities. For 
Christians, this means particularly to think about, and allow formation 
from, technologies in relation to making present reconciliation and 
love, especially to those who suffer. At times, this kind of sociable 
technological formation may look similar to a social model of disabil-
ity because I think it requires us all to be formed by the technologies 
that currently mostly disabled people use. The ramps mentioned above 
that are for the use of all, not only those in wheelchairs, are a key ex-
ample. What might it mean, too, to allow hearing and vision technol-
ogies to form and shape communities, architecture, structure and all? 
This view also makes use of medical models of disability and technol-
ogy, especially in helping articulate ways in which medical solutions 
can be sociable. 
Yet, as I described my concerns with these various models of dis-
ability in the previous section, I do not think this kind of communal 
life focused on the ways technologies (including older forms of tech-
nologies that we no longer consider even as technologies) entirely en-
ables this sacramental making present of reconciliation and love. Part 
of the reason is that the social model of disability, as with technology 
itself, often aims to fix something that cannot be fixed, and that is hu-
man suffering. An emphasis on technology and its sociality does not 
hold with a sense of utopia, at least not when understood in Christo-
logical view. Technology does not eradicate suffering and death, not 
even in the presumed halcyon fields of (relatively) disembodied life 
online.  
39 Of course, the concern with this view is that we all know of Christian communities 
that operate precisely not in these ways, and which do not make present reconciliation 
and love. But I think McCabe here is not trying to presume, or recover, any sense of 
ideal “church” just in the same way that he rejects Jesus as a blueprint. We are given 
the gifts of Jesus, and other humans, to whom we can respond in love and reconcilia-
tion—or not. That our various responses to these gifts do not measure up is not, on 
Christian terms, a reason to reject Jesus as a way of life. 
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Such a view of technology linked to suffering and death accords 
with a new understanding of disability that has emerged as an alterna-
tive to the medical and social models. Deborah Creamer has advocated 
for a theology of disability that focuses on and embraces limits. “The 
limits model highlights the fact that human limits need not (and per-
haps ought not) be seen as negative or as something that is not or that 
cannot be done, and instead claims that limits are an important part of 
being human—a fact that is overlooked when we reflect on the human 
body as generic.”40 For Creamer, one of the advantages of her argu-
ment is that it enables some of the best parts of both the medical and 
social models, but also allows for the fact that those models do not, in 
fact, “cure” disability. A medical model of disability has an important 
place, just as a social model does, with their attempts to enable those 
with disabilities/impairments as full access to social participation as 
possible. Still, both models leave a gap, which is that despite the diag-
noses and the fixes, impairment and disability is still felt in various 
ways. To talk of eradicating impairments or disabilities, as in the coch-
lear implant debate, is indeed to speak of eradicating people, even a 
culture, because eradicating disability cannot be done via technology, 
except insofar as those tools enable death. 
By contrast, Creamer’s theology of embodiedness accepts that we 
have limits, despite, and sometimes because of, our technologies. Ac-
knowledging those limits in relation to disability and technology ena-
bles people state and reflect on those limits in particular ways. This 
deep reflection on limits can and should be part of peoples’ lives, irre-
spective of disability and impairment. For example, instead of envi-
sioning the internet as a broadly open and accepting space for those 
with disabilities, a view to embodiedness acknowledges that humans 
access the internet bodily and in only limited ways; there is no other 
way to access it (not even Google Glass enables full disembodiment). 
The more we recognize our own limits when we use our technologies, 
the more able we are to understand others’ limits in relation to tech-
nology and see that our technologies, however good, are not absolute 
fixes. 
Thus, our best attempts to be formed by sociable technologies also 
requires us to walk with (and hear with, and see with, and think with, 
and so forth) people in the full ranges of their impairments, suffering, 
and disabilities. It means acknowledging the limits of both bodies and 
technologies, seeking ways, instead, to articulate clearly the times 
when technologies fail to form us well. Jesus’ own life, suffering, and 
death offer a strong strand of Christian tradition in this regard, one that 
Christians have articulated and embodied in numerous ways, includ-
ing the sacrament of the sick, the sacrament of reconciliation, healing 
40 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 116. 
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services, foot washing, the Eucharist, peace and reconciliation com-
missions, prayers and meditations on Jesus’ suffering, and so forth. 
These, too, need reflectively to be a strong part of any Christian com-
munity’s desire to be responsive in a technological and able-bodied 
way. The most technologically-savvy and apparently welcoming 
church misses the point if pain and death are not also routinely part of 
that community’s social formation, especially with attention to the 
sufferings of particular people in those communities. 
In conclusion, it is all too easy to slip into a dominant mode of 
technology-as-asocial, and from thence, to unhelpful and even harm-
ful ways of thinking about people with disabilities. Solutions to the 
dominant thoughts about dissociative technologies cannot come from 
thinking about rules we might put in place for using our technologies, 
as we and our technologies are far too diverse for such simplicity. Ra-
ther, as McCabe has suggested, Christians have a whole way of life, a 
life that, if oriented and practiced (at least in part) toward our technol-
ogies and their use because of Jesus, we may have better hope of learn-
ing, ourselves, how to love.  
 
 
